In a size judgment task on words denoting concrete objects, subliminally presented stimuli that precede the targets influence response times dependent on whether responses to the prime and the target are congruent or incongruent (Exp. 1). These findings, mirroring Dehaene et al. (1998), imply that primes are unconsciously categorized and processed to the response stage. However, the effect does not generalize to primes that are not in the response set (Exp. 2), and even exposure to primes not in the response set in an interleaved naming-size judgment task fails to induce it (Exp. 3). But the effect generalizes from lowercase primes to the same set of uppercase targets (Exp. 4), suggesting an abstract level of operation. The findings suggest that rather than from unconscious prime categorization, the congruity effect results from automatized stimulus-response mappings. Potential differences between the number and the word domain are discussed.
A long-standing issue in contemporary psychology is the question to what extent stimuli that are presented below the threshold of conscious awareness undergo processing. A number of studies have addressed this issue by presenting stimuli with low intensity and/or brief duration and measuring their behavioral impact on the processing of subsequent stimuli. With regard to the effects of verbal material, the evidence suggests that subliminally presented words access their lexical representations, as demonstrated in repetition priming that survives even substantial changes in stimulus properties such as case reversal (e.g., Feustal, Shiffrin, & Salasoo, 1983; Forster & Davis, 1984) . Likewise, phonological properties of masked stimulus words have been shown to influence subsequent processing (e.g., Humphreys, Evett, & Taylor, 1982; Perfetti & Bell, 1991) . Furthermore, a number of findings have been reported in which subliminally presented words significantly prime semantic associates (e.g., Balota, 1983; Fischler & Goodman, 1978; Fowler, Wolford, Slade, & Tassinary, 1981; Marcel, 1983) and category coordinates (Damian, 1996; Perea & Gotor, 1997) . In combination, these studies suggest that masked verbal stimuli might be processed to relatively "deep" representational levels without conscious awareness of their presentation (see McLeod, 1998 , for a comprehensive review).
A recent study by Dehaene et al. (1998) confirms and extends these claims about the extent of processing of subliminally presented stimuli. The collection of behavioral data was I would like to thank Pim Levelt, Antje Meyer, Peter Praamstra, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions, and Otto Kokke and Ilse van Leiden for assistance in collecting the data. Direct all correspondence to: Markus F. Damian, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Wundtlaan 1, PB 310, 6500 AH Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Electronic mail: Markus. Damian@mpi.nl. combined with the measurement of electrical and haemodynamic brain activity. Participants performed a simple numerical size judgment task: either a digit or a numeral word between one and nine was presented on a computer screen, and participants judged whether the numerical value of the presented stimulus was smaller or larger than a reference of five by pressing one of two response keys. Prior to the display of the probe stimulus and sandwiched between two randomletter string masks, a prime stimulus was briefly presented that itself consisted of a digit or a numeral word between one and nine. As a result, the prime stimulus could be either congruent or incongruent with the target stimulus regarding the response required by the size judgment task. It was shown that response times were on average 24 ms slower in the incongruent than in the congruent condition. The fact that the masked primes had a substantial impact on the processing time of the probe stimuli was taken to suggest that primes, while being presented below participants' awareness threshold, were themselves judged according to task instructions. This effect was furthermore shown to be essentially independent of the notation format (digits vs. numeral words) of the stimuli, and it also occurred in cross-format conditions (i.e., from numerals to digits and from digits to numerals). Two control experiments investigated participants' ability to consciously perceive the masked primes. It was shown that performance was at chance level on both presence-absence judgments and on a number vs. random letter string discrimination task when the temporal characteristics of a trial were identical to those of the main experiment. Thus, the congruity effect described above must indeed have occurred outside of the participants' awareness. Dehaene et al. proposed that the congruity effect is obtained because participants unconsciously apply the task instructions to the prime words. That is, primes are taken to be perceptually and conceptually processed and then categorized according to the reference frame that is applied to the probe stimuli. Accordingly, a situation of response competition arises in which incongruent prime stimuli activate a response inadequate for the target and hence slow response times compared to the congruent condition in which both primes and targets support the same response. The claim that response competition lies at the root of the congruity effect was corroborated by means of event-related potentials (ERPs) that were measured during the experiment and that also indicated a prime-target congruity effect: lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) measuring low levels of covert motor activation showed a significant negative inflection on incongruent trials prior to the activation of the overt response. This finding implies that the subliminally presented primes activated the motor cortex contralateral to the one activated by the overt response to the targets. A subsequent experiment using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) further verified the motor cortex to be the locus of the congruity effect. In combination, these findings were taken to suggest that subliminally presented stimuli are processed in a stream of perceptual, conceptual, and response-related stages.
Dehaene et al.'s findings are intriguing for a number of reasons. Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence elegantly converge on the conclusion that subliminally presented material undergoes extensive processing. The study is not the first to demonstrate that under certain conditions, masked primes can be processed to the level of response preparation: Neumann and Klotz (1994) obtained a similar behavioral effect in a series of simple judgment tasks, and Schlaghecken and Eimer (1997) and Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) demonstrated electrophysiological motor-related activation induced by masked primes in a task in which arrows were presented as primes and targets, and participants judged the direction in which the target arrow pointed. Rather, Dehaene et al.'s study derives its relevance from the combination of such responserelated indicators with a conceptually mediated task. In contrast to the above studies, Dehaene et al.'s numerical size judgment task obviously requires accessing relatively abstract knowledge about the numerical domain before a response can be determined. Consequently, according to the authors, participants would "unconsciously apply the task instructions to the prime, would therefore categorize it as smaller or larger than 5, and would even prepare a motor response appropriate to the prime" (p. 598). In other words, the same sequence of perceptual, conceptual, and responserelated stages that must be applied to the overtly presented targets to arrive at a response are thought to be induced by the subliminally presented primes. As outlined above, the question of to what extent subliminal stimuli are processed has received long-standing interest in cognitive research. If Dehaene et al.'s suggestion is correct, their findings would constitute more powerful evidence for the "deep" processing of unconscious stimuli than the studies previously conducted. In fact, the authors boldly believe their findings to "resolve the issue of the depth of processing of masked primes" (p. 599).
Indeed, Dehaene et al.'s finding cannot be explained within a "traditional" framework of semantic priming, in which it is assumed that subliminally presented words access their corresponding conceptual characteristics, much like overtly presented words do, for instance, in the Stroop (1935) task. If a subsequent target word is then semantically related to the prime, its respective conceptual representations will be primed, resulting in a response time benefit. Transferred to the number domain, on this account one would have to assume that primes and targets are more closely related on congruent than on incongruent trials. And in fact, in an experiment employing numbers as stimuli, conceptual and response components are potentially confounded: Congruent prime-target combinations (1-4, 4-1, 6-9, 9-6) are numerically closer to each other than incongruent ones (1-6, 1-9, 4-6, 4-9). Previous research (e.g., Brysbaert, 1995; den Heyer & Briand, 1986; Marcel & Forrin, 1974) has suggested that there is a "semantic distance" effect on the number line such that semantic priming decreases with increasing numerical distance between two digits. Such a semantic quantity priming effect would predict the response time benefit on congruent trials compared to incongruent trials that is reflected in the results. However, what it could not account for is Dehaene et al.'s LRP findings, which clearly demonstrate motoric activation evoked by incongruent trials on the contralateral hemisphere.
It is therefore clear that the effect demonstrated by Dehaene et al. must be caused by something other than semantic priming, something which is clearly related to motoric response processes. There remain two possibilities: on the one hand, the effect could be specific to the number domain in that the properties of "large" and "small" might reflect inherent properties of numbers. For instance, Tzelgov, Meyer, and Henik (1992) have argued that single-digit numbers mandatorily evoke a rudimentary dichotomy of "large" and "small", with the number five being neutral (but see Pansky & Algom, 1999 , for recent evidence against such a mandatory activation). Consequently, masked numbers might unconsciously evoke their corresponding conceptual quantity dimension and respective motor response, inducing the demonstrated congruity effect. In this case, the congruity effect would merely constitute an extension of "traditional" accounts of semantic priming (albeit with an attached response component) in that it would reflect a conceptual dimension that is an inherent part of the stimulus and is mandatorily evoked. The other possibility is that the congruity effect is specific to a particular experiment and the involved reference frame. According to this hypothesis, primes can, in the absence of conscious awareness, be categorized according to the same task instructions that are applied to the targets. In this case, the effect would appear to abstract from conceptual characteristics and be attributed to arbitrary task-specific demands. This is apparently Dehaene et al.'s preferred account for their finding: According to the authors, participants would "unconsciously apply the task instructions to the prime, would therefore categorize it as smaller or larger than 5, and would even prepare a motor response appropriate to the prime" (p. 598). This hypothesis considerably extends on more conventional accounts of semantic priming in that unconscious processing would be assumed to possess a similar task-driven flexibility than conscious processing can.
The aim of the present study is to investigate whether a similar response congruity effect can be obtained with nouns referring to concrete objects. The quantity judgment task employed by Dehaene et al. is replaced by a physical size judgment task performed on nouns ("Is the real-world object corresponding to the word HOUSE larger or smaller than a particular reference frame?"). A potential finding of response congruity under these circumstances would by itself be interesting, since the bulk of existing research on subliminal semantic priming has been in the domain of concrete nouns (but see Dell'Acqua & Grainger, 1999 , for a recent study that used pictorial stimuli). Furthermore, this manipulation yields the benefit that with concrete nouns, semantic relatedness and response components can be effectively disconfounded: the masked prime BOAT is not any more conceptually related to the prime HOUSE than the prime SPIDER is, despite the fact that the first pairing is response-congruent (both items require the response "large") while the second is not (the prime is "small" while the target is "large"). If a congruity effect is obtained under these conditions, the claim that task instructions can be unconsciously applied to masked primes in a flexible manner would receive further support. Finally, single-digit numbers are members of an extremely limited set, which puts serious constraints on the experimental material, an aspect that will become relevant in Experiment 2. In contrast, nouns do not underly the same limitations.
The assumption that primes are presented outside of participants' awareness is fraught with methodological problems Merikle, 1982 Merikle, , 1982 Merikle & Cheesman, 1982 ; also see Merikle & Reingold, 1998; Dosher, 1998; Klauer, Greenwald, & Draine, 1998 , for a recent discussion of this issue). The experiments presented here used a post-experimental visibility test in the form of a presence-absence judgment on masked primes, which should be considered one of the most stringent tests of conscious awareness.
Experiment 1

Method
Participants. Sixteen undergraduate students from the participants pool of the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics took part in this experiment in exchange for pay. All were native speakers of Dutch and had normal or correctedto-normal vision.
Materials. Twelve Dutch nouns of medium to high frequency (mean frequency of occurrence per one million word forms: 96.8 in the CELEX database of Dutch word forms) were selected as target words that were to be categorized in the experiment relative to a reference frame of 20 20 cm (see below). Six of them denoted objects that would be correctly categorized as "large", and six denoted "small" objects. Within each group, three words consisted of four letters, and three words consisted of five letters. To construct prime stimuli, these stimuli were combined with each other such that primes either supported a congruent or an incongruent response with regard to the size judgment task. Care was taken to avoid semantic-associative or phonological relationships between primes and targets. This procedure resulted in 24 prime-target pairs (12 congruent and 12 incongruent items). The stimuli and pairings are listed in Appendix A.
Design. The experimental design included response congruity between prime and target (congruent vs. incongruent) as a within-subjects variable, with sixty trials per condition. Each of the 24 prime-target combinations was presented five times across the experiment, resulting in a total of 120 experimental trials. The stimuli were presented in blocks of 24 trials with no pauses between the blocks, such that each possible prime-target combination was shown once in each block. Items were presented in a different random order for each participant, with the constraint that neither the same prime nor the same target word appeared on subsequent trials.
Apparatus. Stimuli were presented with an IBMcompatible computer (Hermac Pentium) on a NEC MultiSync 3D computer monitor. Stimulus presentation and response time collection were controlled using the DMASTR package developed at Monash University and at the University of Arizona by K.I. Forster and J.C. Forster. The stimuli were presented centrally in uppercase standard IBM DOS font in white color on black background, and subtended a visual angle of 1.2 to 1.5 degrees from the viewing distance of 60 cm. A white rectangular frame on the computer screen, centered around the stimuli, served as the reference frame for the size judgment task. The size of the frame was approximately 20 20 cm, subtending a visual angle of 19.5 degrees.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a dimly lit and sound-proof room. They were seated in front of a computer screen at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. Participants were instructed that their task would be to perform a size judgment on objects denoted by centrally presented words. Half of the participants were instructed to press the right shift key on the computer keyboard for a "large" response and the left shift key for a "small" response, and the other half of participants received the reverse mapping.
Similar to Dehaene et al.'s procedure, the masks in this experiment consisted of random letter strings such as "XfaDgeK". Within each trial, participants were first presented with a forward mask for 54 ms. The mask was followed by the presentation of the prime word for 43 ms. The prime stimulus was backward masked by a random letter string mask presented with a duration of 29 ms, after which the target word came on and was presented for 200 ms. Trials were separated from each other by an intertrial interval of 1500 ms after participants had made their response. A different mask was used on each occurrence.
Each participant received a practice block of 24 trials, in which twelve practice words were presented twice each as targets. None of these practice items appeared in the actual experiment. Within the practice block, the nonword string "XYZF" replaced the masked prime stimulus. Then, the experimental block, consisting of 120 trials, was carried out.
After completion of this block, participants were debriefed about the prime manipulation.
To assess participants' ability to consciously perceive the masked prime words, a post-experimental visibility test was employed in the form of a presence-absence judgment. Participants were presented with 96 trials that were identical in their temporal characteristics to the ones from the experiment, but in 48 of which the prime words had been removed. Note that the original primes and targets of the experiment in their original pairings (24 congruent and 24 incongruent trials) were used. Participants were informed about the presence of masked prime words prior to the onset of the targets, and were instructed that now their task would be to detect the absence or presence of such a masked word. They were informed about the fact that exactly half of the trials would contain a prime word, and were instructed to respond approximately equal times with a "yes" and a "no" response, even if they were never able to detect the presence of a prime.
The entire testing session, including the visibility test, lasted approximately 20 min.
Results
For this and the following experiments, one analysis will be reported in which participants are treated as the random factor, and one in which target items are treated as the random factor.
Trials on which participants had made an error, as well as trials with response times deviating more than three SDs from a participant's conditional mean, were excluded from the response time analysis.
A robust effect of semantic congruity was obtained: the congruent condition yielded a mean response latency of 603 ms, and the incongruent condition yielded one of 616 ms. The 13 ms facilitatory effect was significant by participants and by items, F 1 (1, 15) = 6.15, MSE = 1,306, p = .025, F 2 (1, 11) = 5.15, MSE = 1,028, p = .044. Figure 1 shows the means of the response time deciles, pooled over participants and plotted as cumulative distributions, indicating that the effect extends across the whole range of data points.
A similar effect was observed in the errors: an error score of 5.4% on the congruent condition contrasted with an error score of 7.8% on the incongruent condition. The difference of 2.4% was highly significant, F(1, 15) = 13.80, MSE = 46, p = .002.
The presence-absence test of prime visibility yielded a hit rate of 47.0% and a false alarm rate of 44.9%. The resulting d' score of .0645 did not deviate significantly from zero, t(15) = .83, p = .421. Thus, participants were at chance in detecting the presence or absence of the masked primes. Furthermore, the correlation of each participant's individual d' score with the corresponding size of his/her response congruity effect was not significant, r = -.231, p = .389. These results clearly demonstrate that the experimental congruity effect was unrelated to participants' perceptual sensitivity to the masked primes. 
Discussion
The results from Experiment 1 are clear: A substantial response congruity effect was obtained with nouns referring to concrete objects. When a prime word was presented that was incongruent in its response with the subsequently presented target word, response times were significantly and substantially slowed down compared to a case in which prime and target words were congruent in their respective responses. Furthermore, this effect appears to be quite robust in that it was reliably obtained with a small number of participants and items. These findings extend Dehaene et al.'s (1998) findings to the general lexical domain.
Given that prime and target words were never semantically related to each other on any particular trial, some other mechanism than "direct" semantic priming must account for the effect. Although the above experiment did not collect electrophysiological measures of motoric preparation, the only conceivable explanation for the obtained effect is that the primes activated their corresponding motor response and thus created a condition of congruity or incongruity with the overtly required response to the target word. The results thus appear to confirm Dehaene et al.'s hypothesis that unconscious information processing not only involves the conceptual domain -as has been previously claimed -but also extends into the response stage. Apparently, it is just as easy to obtain a response congruity effect in the domain of concrete nouns than it is in the number domain. However, there is a possible alternative account of the response congruity effect which, while also assuming that the primes are unconsciously processed, questions the claim that they must have been semantically categorized. So far, it has been assumed that the size judgment task requires participants to access conceptual knowledge, either in the abstract number domain or in the domain of general lexical semantics. Consequently, if subliminally presented primes evoke their corresponding responses just as overtly presented targets do, it appears plausible that primes undergo a process-ing stream similar to the targets. However, Dehaene et al.'s and the above experiments share certain experimental features that distinguish them from the bulk of published studies on the semantic processing of masked stimuli: first, the same stimuli that are overtly categorized as the targets are also covertly categorized as the primes. In other words, primes are members of the response set. Second, these primes and targets are repeated a large number of times across the experiment: In Dehaene et al.'s experiment measuring ERPs, each of the four critical stimuli (1, 4, 6, and 9) were presented 128 times, plus eight times each as practice items. In Experiment 1 of the present paper, each of the twelve stimuli were presented ten times in the experimental block. This contrasts with studies on semantic priming in which each target is typically presented only once to each participant, so that items in semantically related and unrelated conditions are counterbalanced across participants. Dehaene et al.'s claim about the nature of unconscious processing in this task clearly attributes no special significance to these two experimental aspects. If it is really the case that masked prime words are unconsciously categorized according to task instructions, such processing should hold irregarding the fact that primes were repeatedly judged as targets.
However, an alternative hypothesis that crucially depends on the outlined experimental characteristics might also be able to account for the findings: The substantial amount of target repetition in Dehaene et al.'s study -and to some lesser extent in Experiment 1 -could be conceived of entailing a considerable amount of practice on the particular task at hand. Effects of practice have been extensively researched in the cognitive literature under the header of automaticity vs. controlled processes. Automatic processes are generally assumed to be fast, effortless, autonomous, and oftentimes unavailable to conscious experience (for a review, see, e.g., Logan, 1985) . The acquisition of automaticity has been interpreted as the gradual withdrawal of attention from tasks that are initially attention-demanding (LaBerge & Samuels, 1974; Logan, 1978 , Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977 . Alternatively, memory-based theories of automaticity account for automated performance by a principle of obligatory encoding and retrieval of episodic traces to and from long-term memory. For example, Logan's (1988) instance theory of automaticity proposes that repeated task performance induces a gradual transition from algorithmic-based to memory-based processing. After such a transition has occurred, stimuli in a task will evoke the adequate responses in a fast and effortless manner.
Within the framework of research on automaticity, it is generally assumed that whether automatization occurs depends on the consistency of mapping of the training material, as well as on how familiar the stimuli are and how straightforward the task is. Logan (1988) points out that whereas the effects of practice and automaticity are typically investigated in studies employing a large number of training sessions, "it may be possible to observe automatization in a single session [...] as long as the number of stimuli is small and the stimuli themselves are easy to remember" (p. 501; see NavehBenjamin & Jonides, 1984, and Smith & Lerner, 1986 , for examples). Both conditions definitely apply to the current procedure: the item set is restricted, and the task is decidedly undemanding compared to tasks that are typically employed in research on automaticity, such as alphabet arithmetic (e.g., Logan & Klapp, 1991; Zbrodoff, 1999) .
Is it possible that a size judgment task like the one featured in the above experiment could be performed on the basis of stimulus-response mappings without the intervening algorithm-based decision process? In other words, could the judgment -after a number of training episodes -essentially be performed on the basis of memory of prior episodes, and not based on a relatively complex conceptual decision procedure? Unfortunately, published research does not provide a good basis for predicting how many repetitions would be required for responses to automatize. Whether the -relatively low -number of repetitions in Experiment 1 is enough to induce automaticity is a priori unclear. However, it is also clear that if the congruity effect depended on automatized mappings between stimuli and their corresponding responses, it should clearly build up across the experiment. In contrast, the unconscious semantic categorization account would predict that the effect is already present within the first few repetitions of each stimulus.
Recall that in Dehaene et al.'s experiment, the critical items had already been categorized eight times each in the practice block, a number of repetitions that potentially allows for automaticity to develop. In contrast, the practice items in the above experiment were different from the experimental items. Thus, the experimental items themselves could not have been trained prior to the experiment. This allows an investigation of whether the response congruity effect builds up across the experiment. In Figure 2 , the data from Experiment 1 were plotted as a function of experimental block. Recall that the 24 prime-target combinations were presented exactly once in each of five consecutive blocks. Figure 2 displays the size of the response time and error effects separately across the five blocks.
The congruity effect in the RTs shows a clearly monotonous rise across blocks, reaching its peak in the last block of the experiment. The effect in the errors is nonexistent within the first two blocks of the experiment, but appears in the remaining three blocks. These data clearly demonstrate a rise of the congruity effect across the course of the experiment. They also show that, if the automaticity explanation of the congruity effect holds, a relatively small number of repetitions would be sufficient to induce the effect: The effect is definitely present within block 3, i.e., after four judgment episodes for each target item. To the extent that automaticity develops just as easily for numbers as it apparently does for words, these findings would imply that in Dehaene et al.'s experiment, the effect would already have reached a substantial size by the begin of the experimental block, as each target number had been categorized eight times in the practice block.
These findings appear to question the "unconscious categorization" explanation of the congruity effect, since it is not at all obvious on this account why the congruity effect should build up across the experiment. However, despite the sugges- tiveness of the above finding, it remains possible that participants' visibility adapted across the experiment. It could be that, due to the severe masking procedure that was applied in this experiment, primes were presented below the "objective" perception threshold at the beginning of the experiment. As the experiment progresses, perceptibility improved due to adaptation such that primes now underwent an increasing extent of processing. 1 This possibility would provide an account for the buildup of the effect across the experiment while maintaining the "unconscious categorization" explanation.
The next experiment provides a more powerful test of the hypothesis that automaticity, but not semantic categorization, might be at the root of the response congruity effect. It targets the fact that in Dehaene et al.'s and Experiment 1, the same stimuli were used as primes and targets. The fact that Dehaene et al. presented primes also as targets is a consequence of the severely restricted range of stimuli in the single-digit number domain. However, in the more general domain of lexical semantics, this restriction obviously does not apply, and thus, the effects of response set membership of the primes can be isolated. The unconscious semantic categorization hypothesis would clearly predict a semantic congruity effect for prime words not in the response set, since the visual-semantic-motoric processing stream should apply to any masked prime stimulus. On the other hand, the potential finding that the semantic congruity effect is restricted to prime words within the response set could clearly be handled more easily by the automaticity hypothesis, as research on automaticity has rather clearly suggested that practiced mappings do not easily transfer to other, untrained stimuli.
Experiment 2
For this Experiment, a novel set of stimuli is selected and tested in a pre-experiment similar to Experiment 1 (i.e., they are presented as primes and targets). This also provides a replication of the findings of the first experiment with an independent set of items. In the following, these new words are now presented as primes, while the words employed in Experiment 1 serve as the targets. Thus, in Experiment 2, primes are never overtly categorized as targets throughout the experiment. A replication of the congruity effect under these circumstances would clearly demonstrate the response set factor to be irrelevant, and would consequently strengthen the "unconscious categorization" account. On the other hand, a failure to obtain the congruity effect when primes are not in the response set would clearly favor the automaticity hypothesis.
Method
Participants. Sixteen undergraduate students from the participants pool of the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, none of whom had participated in the first two experiments, took part in this experiment in exchange for pay.
Materials.
Twelve new Dutch words of length and frequency comparable to those employed in Experiment 1 (mean frequency of occurrence per one million word forms: 48.8 in the CELEX database of Dutch word forms) were selected. Like in Experiment 1, these target words were paired with each other to create congruent and incongruent prime words. Again, care was taken to avoid pairings that were semantically, associatively or phonologically related. The stimuli and pairings are listed in Appendix B.
To ensure that this new set of stimuli reliably induced a semantic congruity effect, a pre-experiment was conducted that was identical in all aspects to Experiment 1, except that now the new stimuli were used. Sixteen undergraduate students from the participants pool of the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, none of whom participated in Experiment 1 or the main part of the present experiment, took part in this experiment in exchange for pay. The conditional means closely resembled those obtained in Experiment 1: the congruent condition displayed a mean of 648 ms, whereas the incongruent condition showed a mean of 662 ms. The difference of 14 ms was significant in both participants and items analysis, F 1 (1, 15) = 7.50, MSE = 1,671, p = .015, F 2 (1, 11) = 8.78, MSE = 980, p = .013. Participants made 3.4% errors in the congruent condition, and 5.4% errors in the incongruent condition. The difference of 2.0% was also significant, F = 5.60, MSE = 31, p = .032. Furthermore, when analyzed in terms of blocks across the experiment, the congruity effect displayed a similar buildup to the one obtained in Experiment 1, with -6 ms, 12 ms, 20 ms, 19 ms, and 27 ms in the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth block of experimental trials (error score differences were 0.0%, 0.5%, 3.1%, 3.7%, and 2.6%, respectively). In summary, the new stimulus set yields a pattern virtually identical to the one obtained with the set from Experiment 1, a conclusion that is further confirmed by an analysis that combined the data with those from Experiment 1 and found no significant interaction between the congruity effect and the experiment, Fs ¢ 1 for both response times and errors.
In this pre-experiment, the presence-absence test of prime visibility the results yielded a hit rate of 47.1% and a false alarm rate of 45.1%. The resulting d' score of .049 did not deviate significantly from zero, t(15) = .74, p = .473. Again, the correlation of each participant's individual d' with his/her corresponding size of the response congruity effect was not significant, r = .128, p = .636.
In the following experiment, the items from this new set of words were used as primes, while the stimuli from Experiment 1 served as the targets. The new stimulus pairings are listed in the Appendix C. Apart from that, the experiment was identical in all its aspects to Experiment 1. In other words, the only difference between Experiment 1 and the present experiment is whether primes are members of the target response set.
Design, Apparatus, and Procedure. These were identical to those employed in Experiment 1.
Results
The congruent condition yielded a mean response latency of 586 ms, and the incongruent condition yielded one of 583 ms. The 3 ms difference was not significant by participants nor by items, F 1 = .38, p = .546, F 2 = .33, p = .579.
Participants made 4.4% errors on the congruent condition, and 5.2% errors on the incongruent condition. The difference of 0.8% was not significant, F = .94, p = .348.
The presence-absence test of prime visibility the results yielded a hit rate of 49.9% and a false alarm rate of 46.9%. The resulting d' score of .078 did not deviate significantly from zero, t(15) = 1.37, p = .190.
Discussion
Compared to the results from Experiment 1 and and the pre-experiment described above, the findings in Experiment 2 show a striking discrepancy: the semantic congruity effect vanishes entirely if the prime words are not members of the target set. The fact that exactly these prime words induced a robust congruity effect in the pre-experiment when they were in the response set excludes the possibility that the failure was due to some kind of stimulus property.
These findings cast serious doubts on the account forwarded by Dehaene et al. that was meant to explain the subliminal effect of semantic congruity. To reiterate, Dehaene et al. hypothesized that a prime will undergo the same stream of perceptual, conceptual, and motor processing that the visible target word does, resulting in a response match or mismatch that causes the effect visible in the reaction time data. If this was true, it should be irrelevant whether or not the primes are members of the target set. Contrary to these assumptions, however, Experiment 3 indicates response set membership as a crucial factor in whether the congruity effect is obtained. This finding strengthens alternative explanations of the congruity effect, such as the "automaticity" account outlined above.
There may be another explanation for the failure to obtain a congruity effect if primes are not members of the targets, however. It could be argued that the substantial repetition of targets and the entailing access to their lexical representations might have facilitated visual processing of these items. For instance, research on repetition priming has clearly shown that lexically processed items enjoy facilitation on subsequent processing, oftentimes after substantial time lags. For instance, Ratcliff, Hockley, and McKoon (1985) showed a virtually undiminished repetition effect in a lexical decision task after lags ranging from one to sixteen trials, in addition to a short-term repetition priming effect that merely appeared on adjacent trials. Whereas a number of competing theoretical accounts of repetition priming effects have been suggested, (see Kirsner, 1998 , for a review), at least one family of theories argues that such effects arise as a consequence of temporarily lowered activation thresholds that are required for items to trigger (e.g., Morton, 1979) . Alternatively, repetition priming could be interpreted as a one-shot learning episode of orthographic structures that provides primed items with an advantage over unprimed ones (e.g., Bowers, 1999) . In either case, it is clear that repeatedly presented lexical items enjoy improved processing on subsequent tasks. Accordingly, the repeated presentation of the target words in Experiment 1 and the pre-experiment of Experiment 2 might have facilitated their processing as prime words in those experiments. In contrast, prime words in Experiment 2 were never overtly presented. Thus, the discrepancy in the results could be explained by a difference in prime perceptibility. Note that this hypothesis would not in principle impair Dehaene et al.'s claim that unconsciously processed items are conceptually categorized according to task instructions. Rather, it would be argued that differences in visual characteristics account for the difference in results. 2 The following experiment tests this hypothesis by employing a task in which size judgment trials are interleaved with naming trials. The prime-target combinations are identical to the preceding experiment such that primes are not members of the target set. However, the primes are now presented visibly on the naming trials and thus require extensive processing related to the access of their respective lexical entries (see, e.g., Masson, 2000, and MacLeod, 1996 , for a demonstration of repetition priming in a word naming task, as well as Strain, Patterson, & Seidenberg, 1995 , for evidence indicating that single word naming entails conceptual access). Thus, the perceptual conditions of primes that are also targets -such as in Experiment 1 -should be approximated. If differing prime perceptibility is to account for the discrepancy of the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, then the additional prime processing required by the naming task should eliminate this factor, and the response congruity effect should reappear despite the primes not being members of the response set. On the other hand, a renewed failure to obtain the response congruity effect would make it rather unlikely that a perceptual variable accounts for the pattern of findings.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants. Sixteen undergraduate students from the participants pool of the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, none of whom had participated in any of the above experiments, took part in this experiment in exchange for pay. All were native speakers of Dutch and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials. The prime-target pairings on the size judgment trials were identical to those used in Experiment 2, i.e., primes were not in the response target set. On naming trials, the prime words were presented above threshold.
Design and Apparatus. These were identical to those employed in Experiments 1 and 2.
Procedure. A microphone was placed in front of the participants. They were instructed that their task would be to alternatingly name, and judge words presented on the screen: if a word was presented by itself, it was to named, while, if it was presented as, e.g., "¢ HUIS £ ", they were to judge the size of the corresponding object with a key press. No response times were collected on the naming trials, but participants were not informed about this fact.
On naming trials, the target word was presented for 200 ms, followed by a blank period of 1500 ms in which it was to be named. On size judgment trials, the same temporal sequence of events as in Experiments 1 and 2 applied (forward mask: 54 ms, prime: 43 ms, backward mask: 29 ms, target word: 200 ms, intertrial interval: 1500 ms from key press).
Since the interleaved task yields twice as many trials as Experiments 1 and 2, a short break was provided after the first 120 trials. The entire experimental session lasted approximately 30 min.
Results
A mean of 624 ms was observed for both the congruent and the incongruent condition, F 1 = .01, p = .925, F 2 ¢ .01, p = .985.
The error score was 4.6% in the congruent condition, and 4.8% in the incongruent condition. The difference of 0.2% did not significantly differ from zero, F = .05, p = .822.
The presence-absence test of prime visibility yielded a hit rate of 46.7% and a false alarm rate of 46.0%. The resulting d' score of .021 did not deviate significantly from zero, t(15) = .26, p = .796.
Discussion
This experiment was designed to test whether repeated pre-exposure to prime stimuli in a size judgment task might facilitate their perceptual processing and thus induce them to behave as if they were members of the response set. The results are clear: no congruity effect was obtained. Consequently, the possibility that the repeated exposure to prime words as target words in the same experiment improves visibility of the primes can soundly be rejected.
These findings suggest that the repeated mapping from stimuli to responses quickly automatizes and thus for subliminally presented prime words creates a situation of response competition. Contrasting Dehaene et al.'s proposal, such a competition should not be be considered "conceptual". In fact, the above results suggest that the opposite is the case: automaticity develops quickly as a process that abstracts from the underlying "algorithmic" rules and becomes purely mechanical.
It might be worth considering yet an alternative account of the response set results obtained in Experiments 2 and 3. One could argue that participants pick up on the fact that only a few semantic categories are used repeatedly in the stimulus set. As a consequence, they might -unconsciously -inhibit prime responses to items or categories other than the ones relevant for that particular experiment. This account might be able to account for the fact that primes not in the response set do not yield the congruity effect while avoiding the conclusion that automatized mappings cause the congruity effect in the first place. However, apart from being entirely ad hoc, it cannot account for the buildup of the effect across the experiment demonstrated in Experiment 1, and it further makes the reverse prediction that in the early stages of Experiments 2 and 3, there should be a response congruity effect from primes not in the target set, since it will take some time for participants to build up the inhibition for irrelevant categories. However, a blockwise analysis showed an effect of -1 ms for the first block of Experiment 2, and one of 1 ms for the first block of Experiment 3. Thus, the "semantic inhibition" account does not appear to be a plausible candidate for an explanation of the obtained patterns.
As mentioned in the introduction, Schlaghecken and Eimer (1997) and Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) demonstrated a similar, but obviously nonsemantic congruity effect with arrows as primes/targets and the task to respond to the direction in which the target arrow pointed.
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The authors interpreted their findings within the theoretical framework of "two visual systems" (Milner & Goodale, 1995) . The theory that object identification and spatial localization is achieved in two anatomically and functionally separate visual pathways was proposed by Schneider (1969) and in more detail by Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982) : one visual pathway progresses ventrally to the inferotemporal cortex (the "ventral" stream, serving object vision) while the other visual system progresses dorsally to the posterior parietal cortex (the "dorsal" stream, involved in spatial localization). Milner and Goodale (1995) reformulated this basic distinction by emphasizing task demands rather than input properties: one visual system is assumed to provide the assembly of integrated representations required for object recognition ("visual perception system") while the other is in charge of the preparation and control of object-directed actions ("visuomotor system"). Importantly, conscious awareness appears to be an exclusive property of the "visual perception" pathway, as evidenced in, for instance, "blindsight" patients (e.g., Weiskrantz, 1986 ) that suffer from impaired object recognition in the affected parts of their visual field, but are still able to make directional judgments via their visuomotor system.
Assuming that Eimer and Schlaghecken's conclusions are correct, could the present findings be interpreted in a similar way? The claim that repeated stimulus-response mappings rather than semantic categorization underlies the effect implies a "shallow" nature, not unlike the congruity effect from arrow primes and targets. In this way, it might be tempting to attribute both Eimer and Schlaghecken's and the present results to the same mechanism, namely processing within the visuomotor system. However, it appears that in order to draw such a conclusion, the congruity effect should be bound to specific perceptual qualities. In other words, given its "immediate" nature, the dorsal visual stream is unlikely to support abstraction from a specific visual input. While Experiment 3 demonstrates that the congruity effect is bound to a specific set of stimuli, the conclusion does not follow that these stimuli must be perceptually specific.
At first sight, Dehaene et al.' s experiment already appears to argue against the specificity of the congruity effect by demonstrating that the size of the effect is essentially unaffected by the notation (arabic digit vs. numeral) of either prime or target: The cross-format conditions constitute a case in which arbitrary forms are mapped onto a common semantic representation. The fact that the response congruity effect remains the same independent of notation seems to eliminate the possibility that the effect is specific to particular physical characteristics. However, the notation factor in their experiment was in fact varied as a within-participants factor, meaning that all participants were exposed to (and according to the automaticity hypothesis, acquired motoric responses for) every item. It therefore does not clearly speak to the issue of whether the congruity effect is abstract or specific.
The following experiment provides a first test of the question to what extent the congruity effect abstracts from a specific visual input. It is formally identical to Experiment 1 in that primes and targets stem from the same set of words. However, primes are now presented in lowercase letters while targets are presented in uppercase letters. Such a case reversal manipulation is quite common in research on masked repetition priming (e.g., Forster & Davis, 1984) : the demonstration that "read" primes "READ" is usually taken as implying that the priming effect is not just due to visual repetition, but must have reached some level of abstractness such as lexical access. The same logic applies to the following experiment. If the congruity effect -apart from being specific to a particular prime-target set -is bound to a specific visual input pattern, then it might plausibly be attributed to the "visuomotor system". In contrast, if a case reversal between prime and target does not impair the effect, it must have reached at least some level of abstractness. Consequently, an interpretation of it entirely in terms of the visuomotor system would be questionable.
Experiment 4
Method
Materials. The prime-target combinations used in Experiment 1 were employed. However, prime words were now displayed in lowercase letters, while targets were displayed in uppercase letters, just like in Experiments 1 to 3.
Results
Similar to Experiment 1, a robust effect of semantic congruity was obtained: the congruent condition yielded a mean response latency of 576 ms, and the incongruent condition yielded one of 592 ms. The 16 ms facilitatory effect was significant by participants and by items, F 1 (1, 15) = 5.67, MSE = 1,838, p = .031, F 2 (1, 11) = 21.52, MSE = 1,986, p = .001. Participants made 4.2% errors on congruent trials, and 7.5% errors on incongruent trials. The difference of 3.3% was statistically significant, F = 5.00, MSE = 89, p = .041. Furthermore, a development of the congruity effect across the experiment was observed that mirrored the one obtained in Experiment 1 and the pre-experiment of Experiment 2, with an effect of 3 ms, 13 ms, 8 ms, 28 ms, and 24 ms for the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth block of experimental items, and an error percentage difference of 1.1%, 2.1%, 4.2%, 4.2%, and 5.3%, respectively. An analysis that combined the data from the present data with the data from Experiment 1 yielded no significant interaction between the congruity effect and the experiments, Fs ¢ 1 for both response times and errors.
The presence-absence test of prime visibility yielded a hit rate of 49.2% and a false alarm rate of 45.7%. The resulting d' score of .117 did not deviate significantly from zero, t(15) = 1.06, p = .305. Once again, the correlation of each participant's individual d' with the corresponding size of his/her response congruity effect was not significant, r = .-.370, p = .158.
On a general level, the letters of the alphabet vary in the similarity of their upper-and lowercase versions: for instance, "o"/"O" are perceptually very similar while "r"/"R" are so dissimilar that their common mapping onto an underlying representation is largely arbitrary. In order to evaluate possible effects of upper-and lowercase similarity, the alphabetic similarity matrix of computer characters provided by Boles and Clifford (1989) was consulted. In this study, visual similarity ratings were collected for every possible upper-and lowercase combination of letters of the alphabet, ranging from 1 (low visual similarity) to 5 (high similarity). For the present purpose, only the ratings between upper-and lowercase versions of the same letter are relevant. To that aim, the rating scores for all the letters within each word of the stimulus set used above were averaged to gain a rough measure of visual overlap. The obtained indices ranged from 2.95 to 3.65. These index values were then entered into a regression analysis as the independent variable, with the effect of semantic congruity for a particular item as the dependent variable. The results yielded an R 2 of less than .001, which did not deviate significantly from chance, F ¢ .001. In other words, the degree of visual overlap between upper-and lowercase versions of a particular item does not appear to affect the size of the congruity effect obtained for that item.
Discussion
Experiment 4 was designed to test whether the congruity effect abstracts from a specific visual input pattern. A case reversal between -otherwise identical -prime and targets was employed, mimicking studies in the domain of masked repetition priming (e.g., Forster & Davis, 1984) . The results clearly suggest some level of abstraction on which the effect operates: the case reversal manipulation did not reduce the congruity effect. Experiment 2 and 3 suggested that the effect arises as a consequence of repeated target-response key mappings that are evoked by the subliminally presented primes. The results of Experiment 4 imply that these mappings do not require exactly the same visual pattern to be evoked, and thus support some degree of abstraction.
These findings cast doubt on an interpretation of the current results in terms of the "visuomotor system" proposed by Milner and Goodale (1995) . Since abstraction from the specific visual input appears to require some degree of object identification, it is more likely that both the visuomotor and the object processing system contribute to the congruity effect. This conclusion is also in agreement with the argument first pointed out by Milner (1974) that most object-directed actions, although plausibly supported by the dorsal stream, nevertheless require quite extensive object processing in order to succeed, which is a property of the ventral stream. Therefore, it seems likely that processing of both streams is not easily dissociated in most tasks.
This conclusion, then, would imply for the present study that not only the visuomotor system, but also the object perception system can function in the absence of conscious awareness. Such an assumption is in agreement with the existing studies mentioned in the introduction that have demonstrated subliminal semantic priming: the tasks involved in these studies, such as lexical decision or naming, are not action-related in any conceivable fashion, so that semantic priming effects must clearly result from "deep" levels of object recognition. Consequently, these studies also support the conclusion that not only the dorsal, but also the ventral visual pathway is able to process information in the absence of conscious awareness.
General Discussion
The issue of to what extent subliminally presented stimuli undergo cognitive processing has been of interest to cognitive psychologists for a long time. The current paper demonstrates that in a size judgment task on words denoting concrete objects, subliminally presented stimuli that precede the target words influence response times dependent on whether a response to the prime is congruent or incongruent with the response to the target. These findings imply that the primes were unconsciously processed up to the response stage, and extend and generalize a similar effect recently reported by Dehaene et al. in a numerical judgment task. However, it is shown that the congruity effect does not transfer to prime words that are not members of the response set. This failure suggests that the effect arises on the basis of rapidly acquired mappings between targets and response keys that are also applied to subliminally presented primes. The fact that such stimulus-response mappings can be evoked subliminally is in accordance with earlier studies demonstrating similar ef-fects (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998 ). However, they should not be mistaken for processes of unconscious conceptual categorization. Consequently, the implications of these findings with regard to the issue of the processing depth of unconsciously presented material are questionable, and by analogy, the same conclusion should apply to Dehaene et al.'s findings.
Could the number domain differ from the word domain?
To this point, it was implicitly assumed that when comparing Dehaene et al.'s findings to the above experiments, the examined stimulus domains as well as the respective tasks were analogous. That is, it was assumed that numbers merely constitute a subset of conceptual representations, just as concrete objects do, and furthermore that a quantity judgment performed on numbers is equivalent to a physical size judgment performed on concrete nouns. But while the congruity effect within the two domains looks very similar, the possibility of course exists that fundamentally different mechanisms might be at the root of the effects demonstrated in Dehaene et al. and the present paper. For instance, it could be argued (S. Dehaene, personal communication, November 26, 2000) that quantity constitutes the primary conceptual dimension of numbers, and that a quantity judgment task tapping into this dimension therefore yields unconscious semantic categorization effects. In contrast, while a physical size judgment on concrete nouns relative to an arbitrary reference frame requires access to conceptual characteristics, it does not tap primary semantic dimensions (unless one assumes that "large" and "small" constitute such a primary semantic dimension of concrete objects). As a consequence, automaticity might develop in the case of a noun judgment, while unconscious semantic categorization still accounts for the findings with numbers. Clearly, the present findings do not unambiguously speak to this issue. But a possible extension of the current study that arises from this argument would be to employ a noun judgment task that does indeed tax a primary conceptual dimension, such as an animacy judgment task. Unfortunately, in such a task, congruent trials (animate prime, animate target; inanimate prime, inanimate target) would be more closely conceptually related than incongruent trials (animate prime, inanimate target; inanimate prime, animate target). Thus, just as with number stimuli, response congruity and semantic relatedness are confounded, and a potential response time affect could not be unambiguously interpreted. This is a problem that the experiments reported above avoid.
At a minimum, the above experiments suggest that automaticity can develop with at a surprisingly small number of repetitions. This allows for the further possibility that in Dehaene et al.'s experiment, unconscious semantic quantity processes (resulting from the fact that number primes and targets are semantically closer on congruent than on incongruent trials) and motoric unconscious processes (arising from automated mappings) coexist. In this case, it would be unclear what the crucial motoric response competition effect demonstrated by Dehaene et al. is based on: the behavioral congruity effect could be caused by quantity priming, while the obtained motoric effect could be due to automatized mappings. The crucial test for the unconscious semantic categorization hypothesis in the number domain therefore cannot be based on response times: showing that prime numbers that are never in the response set nevertheless induce a behavioral congruity effect could still be explained by the fact that primes and targets are more closely related on congruent than on incongruent trials. Only the measurement of the corresponding LRPs could further illuminate this issue: Contralateral LRPs evoked by incongruent primes that are not members of the response set could not plausibly be caused by quantity priming, yet also cannot be caused by repeated mappings. Thus, such a potential finding would appear to provide the strongest evidence for the hypothesis that unconscious categorization rather than motoric automatization causes the congruity effect in the number domain.
On a more general level, the current findings should be taken as a cautionary note not to underestimate the power of repeated stimulus-response mappings when attempting to assess a cognitive process that is presumably algorithm-based. In particular, cognitively undemanding tasks, such as the size judgment tasks employed here, apparently automatize so quickly that response time effects obtained with repeated exposures of the same stimulus set should not necessarily be interpreted as conceptual ones. I recommend that future research on the nature and extent of subliminal semantic priming should thus revert back to the design of most earlier studies and avoid such repeated mappings. Of course, due to the severely restricted choice of stimuli in the single-digit domain, such a proposal would virtually eliminate the possibility of using numbers as stimuli to investigate this issue.
